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I. INTRODUCTION
The Human Genome Project ("HGP"), combined with technological
advances in assisted reproduction, raises a panoply of novel issues in law
and ethics. Among the thorniest questions are those which appear to pit the
autonomy of parents against the best interests of their present or future child.
Whereas in the past, parents had no control over the genetic endowment of
their children and little ability to predict which genetic diseases their
children might fall prey to as they grew up, new technology now gives
parents significant information and control. Parents affected by hereditary
deafness can ensure that their children will not share their disability-or,
they can use the new technology to ensure that their children will be deaf.
Parents in families at high risk of Huntington's Disease, which only shows
itself in late adulthood, can now have their children tested for the gene and
know the child's fate before the child is old enough to have any say in the
matter. These are only two examples of an almost infinite number of
choices, decisions and interventions theoretically available as a result of the
HGP.
The "gatekeepers" who mediate the access of laypeople to genetic
information and technology have been primarily physicians and genetic
counselors, along with Ph.D. geneticists. Ethical standards are spelled out in
professional codes of conduct,1 discussed in Hospital Ethics Committees, 2
and analyzed and promulgated by national bodies such as the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Biomedical and
Behavioral Research.
3
1. E.g., THE CODE OF ETHICS OF THE NATIONAL SOCIETY OF GENETIC COUNSELORS,
reprinted in DIANNE M. BARTELS, PRESCRIBING OUR FUTURE 169 (1993) [hereinafter BARTELS,
PRE ScRmiNG OUR FUTURE].
2. See generally BowEN HOSFORD, BIOETics COMMITTEES: THE HEALTHCARE
PROVIDER'S GUIDE (1986).
3. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDmONS: A
[Vol. 28:549
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Until recently, genetic medicine and genetic counseling have been
characterized by a virtually unquestioned commitment to patient autonomy,
expressed through the twin principles of nondirective counseling and value
neutrality. Counselors prided themselves on giving their clients4 information
which empowered them to make decisions based on their own values, with
no evaluative comments from the counselors. Even when counselors feared
that clients' decisions might lead to a great deal of avoidable suffering, they
felt professionally required to hold their tongues. Now, however, this ethic
of client autonomy is being challenged by the opportunities created by the
HGP. In this paper, I examine three difficult issues raised by the HGP, and
lay out an approach that takes seriously the interests of the child, present or
future, while preserving the traditional commitment of professional
geneticists to patient autonomy. The approach I take is based on Joel
Feinberg's concept of "the child's right to an open future."
5
In Part II, I describe the Human Genome Project, as well as the advances
in assisted reproduction which give people ways to make use of the
information engendered by the HGP. In Part Ill, I discuss the ethics of
medical genetics, especially the primacy of client autonomy and how it
grounds the tenets of value neutrality and nondirective counseling. I
describe three current issues that pose challenges to a professional ethic of
value neutrality: (1) disabled parents who seek assistance in ensuring the
birth of a child who shares their disability (e.g., hereditary deafness or
dwarfism); (2) predictive testing of children for adult-onset genetic
disorders; (3) sex selection. In Part IV, the heart of the paper, I construct a
new approach to dealing with these issues, based on Feinberg's concept of a
child's right to an open future.6 I argue that these issues should not be
conceptualized as balancing parental autonomy against the welfare of the
child, but as balancing parental autonomy against the autonomy (right to an
open future) of the child, and I explain why this approach is more likely to
yield constructive results. I then return to those questions in greater detail,
REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR GENETIc SCREENING,
COUNSELING, AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS (1983).
4. I use the term "patient" and "client" interchangeably in this article. On the one
hand, persons seeking information about their genetic endowment, and certainly persons
seeking assistance in influencing the endowment of their children, have a "doctor-patient"
relationship in the social and legal senses of that term. On the other hand, the term "patient"
carries troubling connotations of passivity which are particularly unfortunate in this field,
where the person seeking information is often a woman and is (usually) not ill.
5. Joel Feinberg, The Child's Right to an Open Future, in WILLIAM AIKEN, WHOSE
CHILD? CHIDREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124 (1980).
6. Id.
1997]
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showing how the issues in Part III fare when subjected to the scrutiny of an
approach based on the child's right to an open future. Thus, in Part V, I
discuss the case of deaf parents who ask for assistance in making sure that
they have only deaf children. In Part VI, I look at the question of parents
who request that their children be tested for genetic disorders that will not
manifest themselves until later in life, and in Part VII I discuss parents who
wish to select the sex of their offspring.
II. THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
A. The Human Genome Project
The Human Genome Project is an international 7 effort to decipher the
entire genetic blueprint of human beings, an undertaking that James Watson,
discoverer of the "double helix" 8 and past director of the National Center for
Human Genome Research, has described as similar in magnitude to the
effort to send a man to the moon. 9 The goal of the 15-year Project, which
began in 1988, is to map and sequence the roughly 100,000 genes that make
up the human genome. 10 The United States is a leader of this effort, with
over $3 billion budgeted for the HGP,11 primarily channeled through the
National Institutes of Health ("NIH") and the Department of Energy
("DOE").12 The medical applications of the HGP fall into three broad
categories: increased ability to screen for genetic disorders, such as
Huntington's Disease; the potential to produce "genetic profiles" of
7. The international project is termed HUGO, for the European Human Genome
Organization. Benjamin Sachs & Bruce Korf, Clinical Commentary: The Human Genome
Project: Implications for the Practicing Obstetrician, 81 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 458,
458-59 (1993).
8. JAMES WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE DIScOvERY OF
THE STRUCTURE OF DNA xi (1968).
9. James Watson, The Human Genome Project: Past, Present, and Future, 248
SCIENCE 44 (April 7, 1990).
10. "Genome" denotes the complete genetic blueprint of a particular species, in this
case, humans. "Mapping" a gene essentially determines its "address," or location on one of 46
chromosomes, while "sequencing" a gene discovers its actual make-up. Thus, mapping tells
us "where" it is, and sequencing tells "what" it is. Because mapping is easier than sequencing,
the immediate goal of the 15-year HGP is to map the entire genome, while sequencing the
entire genome will come later. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, THE HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT: NEW TOOLS FOR TOMORROW'S HEALTH REsEARCH (NIH-3190) 5 (1992).
11. Francis S. Collins, Medical and Ethical Consequences of the Human Genome
Project, 2 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 260,261 (1991).
12. Sachs & Korf, supra note 7, at 458-59.
[Vol. 28:549
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individuals to predict their risk for a variety of diseases; and eventually the
ability to reverse genetic defects and to use "gene therapy" to treat
disorders.
13
Unfortunately, our ability to detect and predict genetic disease will
precede by some decades any substantial ability to effect cures. 14 However,
even without the ability to "fix" a gene, there are a number of strategies
people can employ to use the genetic information that is even now coming
out of the Project on virtually a weekly basis. 15 Whether our use of that
information is for good or for ill, remains to be seen. A unique feature of the
HGP is that the NIH and the DOE have set aside three percent of the total
Project budget to support research on the ethical, legal, and social issues that
this new information engenders.
16
B. New Reproductive Technologies
Until the late 1960s, all that medicine could offer to worried couples
was to ascertain their risk of having children with genetic disorders, and to
examine the children upon birth to see how the dice had fallen. Couples, in
their turn, could either take their chances or refrain from reproducing. With
the advent of ultrasound (which provides an image of the fetus in utero) and
amniocentesis, parents were given a new option. Now, early in the second
trimester, fetal cells could be drawn out of the amniotic fluid and tested for
certain genetic defects, e.g., Down's Syndrome and Tay-Sachs Disease.
Parents could then decide whether or not to terminate the pregnancy. At
13. Lori Whittaker, The Implications of the Human Genome Project for Family
Practice, 35 J. FAM. PRAc. 294 (1992).
14. Genes are being localized far more rapidly than treatments are being developed
forthe afflictions they cause, and the human genome project will accelerate this trend.
The acquisition of genetic knowledge is, in short, outpacing the accumulation of
therapeutic power-a condition that poses special difficulties for genetic knowing.
Nancy Wexler, Clairvoyance and Caution: Repercussions firom the Human Genome Project,
in THE CODE OF CODES: ScIENTIRc AND SOciAL IssuEs IN THE HUMAN GENOME PRoJECr 211
(Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., 1992). See also Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, Mapping
the Human Genome, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 579, 586 (1991); Norman Fost, Genetic Diagnosis
and Treatment: Ethical Considerations, 147 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 1190, 1193 (1993).
15. Jacques Testart, The New Eugenics and Medicalized Reproduction, 4 CAMBRIDGE
Q. HEALTHCARE ETHIcs 304, 305 (1995) ("Mhe new eugenics ...will consist not of
manipulation of the genome but in its selection.").
16. Collins, supra note 11, at 264.
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first, the number of disorders which could be detected were very few, but
that number has grown exponentially with the advances of the HGP. 17
Amniocentesis, however, has some obvious drawbacks. Although the
procedure is considered safe and is routinely offered to women at risk for
genetic defects (e.g., all women over 35 are considered at high risk for
Down's Syndromel 8), there is a small risk of infection, injury to the fetus, or
an unintended loss of pregnancy. 19 Results cannot be obtained until the
second trimester, when the woman may be obviously pregnant and when
fetal movements have already been felt. This makes abortion medically
more serious and psychologically more difficult.20 A procedure which is
still experimental avoids some of these problems by isolating fetal cells
which are present in the bloodstream of a pregnant woman; instead of
having to invade the uterus to get at the amniotic fluid, all that is necessary
is to draw blood from the mother.
21
17. When looking for certain kinds of information, one often finds out other things as
unlooked for by-products, and these "secondary results," to coin a term, often raise serious
ethical issues of their own. The sex of the fetus, for example, is the most obvious thing the
technician sees when performing a chromosomal analysis. This enables amniocentesis to be
used for sex selection. Another problem arises when technicians discover very ambiguous
information in the course of looking for some other piece of knowledge. For example, there
was a time when a boy with an extra Y chromosome was thought perhaps to be at increased
risk of violent, criminal behavior. But the link was never clear (it has now been repudiated),
and there was an obvious risk of "self-fulfilling prophecy" if parents were warned that their
children were at risk. AUBREY MILUNSKY, KNow YouR GENES 39-48 (1977). What should
geneticists have done if they had discovered, perhaps in the course of doing a test to rule out
Down's Syndrome, that a fetus had this extra chromosome? Should the parents have been
told, and perhaps given the opportunity to terminate the pregnancy, or to raise the child with
extra care? Robert M. Veatch, The Unexpected Chromosome... a Counselor's Dilemma, 2
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 8 (Feb. 1972).
18. Kathleen Nolan, First Fruits: Genetic Screening, 22 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S2 (July
1992).
19. Mark Evans et al., Genetic Testing and Screening: 11. Prenatal Diagnosis, 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHIcs 986, 988 (rev. ed. 1995). Chorionic villus sampling ("CVS") is
preferable in some ways to amniocentesis because it is a first-trimester technique. The
chorionic villi are fore-runners of the placenta and a sample can be obtained by aspiration
between nine and twelve weeks of pregnancy. However, increased risk of miscarriage and
fetal limb damage are drawbacks of CVS. Id. at 988; Chorionic Le Villus Sampling and
Amniocentesis: Recommendations for Prenatal Counseling, 44 MMWR - MORBIDrrY AND
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. (CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL) 1 (July 21, 1995).
20. BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, THE TENTATIVE PREGNANCY: PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS AND
THE FuruRE OF MOTHERHOOD 78-80 (1986).
21. Jeffrey Botkin, Ethical Issues in Human Genetic Technology, 17 PEDIATRICIAN 100,
103 (1990); Laurie McGinley, Tricky Prenatal Tests in Embryonic Stages, WALL ST. J., Jan.
[Vol. 28:549
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Because abortion carries medical, emotional and economic costs, it
would obviously be preferable to come up with a way to select or avoid
genetic characteristics before pregnancy begins. One possibility, which is
not yet effective but clearly on the medical horizon, is to sort out gametes
before fertilization. This is more readily done with sperm, as they are more
easily accessed and manipulated than eggs. Sperm could be collected,
analyzed and sorted for the relevant characteristics, and then only the
desirable sperm could be used for fertilization. 22 For example, a couple at
risk for hemophilia, a genetic disease which affects only males, could have
the husband's sperm sorted to exclude sperm with Y chromosomes (those
which will produce male children).
Although gamete sorting is still in the experimental stage, the same goal
can be achieved in a more burdensome fashion by combining in vitro
fertilization ("IVF') with preimplantation genetic diagnosis ("PIGD"). IVF
is a technique which was developed primarily to help women who cannot
achieve pregnancy because their fallopian tubes are blocked. Women with
this condition are able to produce eggs, but the eggs cannot travel down the
fallopian tubes, become fertilized, and continue their journey to the uterus.
In IVF, one or more eggs are removed (by transvaginal aspiration) from the
woman's ovaries, and fertilized in the laboratory with sperm from the
partner. The resulting embryos are then placed into the uterus,
circumventing the blocked tubes. Because this is a cumbersome procedure
with a relatively low success rate, it is now customary to increase the
chances of success by hormonally inducing the woman to superovulate,
producing an average of ten eggs.23 These eggs are retrieved and fertilized;
three to six are put back in the hope that one or two will implant and grow;24
any extras are frozen for possible future attempts.25 The existence of a large
number of in vitro embryos makes possible preimplantation diagnosis, in
12, 1995, at B6; Fetal Cells in Maternal Blood: Prospects for Noninvasive Prenatal
Diagnosis, 731 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. OF SCIENCES 1 (1994). See also Isolating Fetal Cells in
Maternal Blood-The Importance of Ethical Reflection, 2 NABER NEWS 1 (1996).
22. Sex Selection for Non-Medical Reasons (An Official Statement of the Dutch Health
Council), BuLL. MED. ETHICS 8 (June 1995).
23. Report of the Human Embryo Research Panel (Nat'l Inst. of Health, Final Draft),
Sept. 27, 1994, at 23 [hereinafter Human Embryo Research Report].
24. Id.
25. The legal status of these "frozen embryos" has generated a great deal of scholarship
and at least one major case, in which a divorced couple faced off over who had the right to
determine the fate of their mutual frozen potential offspring. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588
(Tenn. 1992) Most fertility clinics now have the foresight to require clients to decide those
issues before undergoing the procedure.
1997]
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which cells are removed from the eight-celled embryos on the third day after
fertilization and subjected to DNA analysis. The results are available within
eight to twelve hours, and the individual embryos can then be transferred to
the uterus, discarded, or frozen for another day.26 This technology has been
available since the early 1990s.27 As of 1994, 29 healthy children had been
born through the use of this technique. and 11 more pregnancies were in
progress .28
C. Summary
Because of the Human Genome Project, we are on the brink of being
able to identify virtually every genetic aspect of the individual, as well as
genetic predispositions which combine with environmental factors to create
the added risk of disease. Through the techniques of assisted reproduction,
we have the technology to put that knowledge to use by enabling parents to
have significant control over the genetic make-up of their offspring. At
present, this technology is expensive and cumbersome, which tends to act as
a natural check on its use for all but the most serious of concerns (for
example, to avert the birth of a child with a fatal genetic disease, such as
Tay-Sachs). However, as the technology becomes more streamlined and
accessible, questions will inevitably arise as to what constitutes an
appropriate use. In III.C below, I describe three such dilemmas, but new
ones arise every day.
III. THE ETHICS OF GENETIC COUNSELING
A. The Present Ethos
The genetic counseling profession is characterized by a respect for
patient autonomy that is greater than in almost any other area of medicine.
29
26. Alan H. Handyside, Genetic Testing and Screening: 1. Preimplantation Diagnosis,
2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIoETHIcs 985 (rev. ed. 1995).
27. Alan H. Handyside et al., Pregnancies from Biopsied Human Preimplantation
Embryos Sexed by Y-Specific DNA Amplification, 344 NATURE 768 (1990); Alan H.
Handyside et al., Birth of a Normal Girl After In Vitro Fertilization and Preimplantation
Diagnostic Testing for Cystic Fibrosis, 327 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 905,905 (1992).
28. See Human Embryo Research Report, supra note 23, at 25. Among the diseases
which have been successfully avoided through PIGD are Tay-Sachs, cystic fibrosis, Lesch-
Nyhan syndrome, and Duchenne muscular dystrophy.
29. Collins, supra note 11, at 262.
[Vol. 28:549
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The Code of Ethics of the National Society of Genetic Counselors states that
its members strive to:
** Respect their clients' beliefs, cultural traditions, inclinations,
circumstances, and feelings.
** Enable their clients to make informed independent decisions, free of
coercion, by providing or illuminating the necessary facts and clarifying the
alternatives and anticipated consequences. 30
Considering the uncertain and stochastic nature of genetic counseling, and
especially in light of the difficulty physicians experience in sharing
uncertainty with patients,31 it is remarkable that medical geneticists have
hewed so strongly to an ethic of patient autonomy. This phenomenon can be
explained by at least five factors: the desire to disassociate themselves as
strongly as possible from the discredited eugenics movement; 32 an equally
strong desire to avoid the label of "abortionist" (a realistic fear if counselors
are perceived as ones who advocate the abortion of genetically damaged
fetuses); 33 the fact that few treatments are available for genetic diseases; 34
an awareness of the intensely private nature of reproductive decisions; the
fact that genetic decisions can have major consequences for entire
families. 35 As one counselor said, "I am not going to be taking that baby
home-they will. ' 36
It should be explicitly stated ... that one of the prime tenets of genetic counseling is
patient autonomy. Counselors do not seek to tell patients whether they should obtain
certain information or what they should do with it if they acquire it. The goal is to
inform patients about what is possible and what their options are. Counselors help
patients to work through those options and then to decide on their own principles
what is the right choice for them."
Id. at 262.
30. THE CODE OF ETHICS OF THE NATIONAL SOCIETY OF GENETIC COUNSELORS, reprinted
in BARTELS, PRESCRIBING OUR FUTURE, supra note 1, at 169-71.
31. JAY KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
32. James R. Sorenson, Genetic Counseling: Values That Have Mattered, in BARTELS,
PRESCRIBING OUR FUTURE, supra note 1, at 11; Arthur L. Caplan, The Ethics of Genetic
Counseling, in BARTELS, PRESCRIBING OUR FUTURE, supra note 1, at 161.
33. Charles Bosk, The Workplace Ideology of Genetic Counselors, in BARTELS,
PRESCRIBING OUR FUTURE, supra note 1, at 27-28.
34. Id. at 29.
35. Dianne M. Bartels, Preface, in BARTELS, PRESCRIBING OUR FUTURE, supra note 1, at
ix-xiii.
36. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 40.
1997]
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The commitment to patient autonomy is expressed in the twin tenets of
value-neutrality and nondirectiveness.37 The ethos of value neutrality finds
expression in the practice of nondirective counseling. Counselors define
their task as giving accurate information to clients in such a way that clients
can use that information to act according to their own values. Barbara Katz
Rothman and others have written about the social and medical pressure
women experience to undergo amniocentesis. Nonetheless, even Rothman
agrees that most counselors truly value nondirectiveness and "seek it as a
goal," even if they do not always succeed in expressing that ideal.38
B. The Challenge to Value Neutrality
Arthur Caplan has criticized value neutrality and nondirective
counseling, what he calls a "just the facts, Ma'am" approach to counseling.
Caplan's critique rests in part on counseling's "powerlessness" in the case of
"what may be immoral requests" such as the desire to have a deaf child.
Further, Caplan argues that the Human Genome Project makes it imperative
that we drop the facade of value neutrality in order to confront the questions
of what counts as disease or disorder, what kinds of disorders we wish to
target for detection and treatment, and so on.39 Following Caplan, we might
press further and ask, can a condition be defined as a disorder in one family
and not in another? In a way, that is already true. One couple might define,
e.g., Down's Syndrome, as a disorder so disruptive to family functioning
that it necessitates abortion, while another couple would take it in stride. But
can we be so value-neutral that a condition that is defined as a disorder in
one family is actually an asset in another? Put another way, can we imagine
basic health (e.g., normal hearing) being redefined as a disorder?
Imagine a deaf couple approaching a genetic counselor. The couple's
goals are to learn more about the cause(s) of their own deafness, and, if
possible, to maximize the chance that any pregnancy they embark upon will
result in a deaf child. Suppose that the couple falls into the 50% of clients
whose deafness has a genetic origin, and into the 33% whose deafness is
autosomal recessive. 40 As Walter Nance describes the challenge:
37. Bosk, supra note 33, at 27.
38. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 27.
39. Caplan, supra note 32, at 161.
40. D. Lindhout et al., Approaches to Genetic Counseling, 630 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD.
ScIm cEs 223,224 (1991).
558 [Vol. 28:549
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It turns out that some deaf couples feel threatened by the prospect of having
a hearing child and would actually prefer to have a deaf child. The
knowledge that we will soon acquire [due to the Human Genome Project]
will . . . provide us with the technology that could be used to assist such
couples in achieving their goals. This, in turn, could lead to the ultimate test
of nondirective counseling. Does adherence to the concept of nondirective
counseling actually require that we assist such a couple in terminating a
pregnancy with a hearing child or is this nonsense?4 1
The genetic counselor who adheres strictly to the tenets of value-neutral,
nondirective counseling will respond by helping the couple to explore the
ways in which they can achieve their goal: a deaf baby. (Thanks to the
technology described in Part I, the couple's goals can be realized without
recourse to abortion, thus simplifying at least some of the ethical issues.)
But as Nance's depiction of this scenario suggests, the counselor may well
feel extremely uneasy about her role here. It is one thing to support a
couple's decision to take their chances and "let Nature take its course," but
to treat as a goal what is commonly considered to be a risk, may be more
pressure than the value-neutral ethos can bear.
Robert Wachbroit and David Wasserman offer a helpful but only partial
answer to this dilemma in distinguishing value neutrality from
nondirectiveness. 4 2 The goal of nondirectiveness is patient autonomy. Value
neutrality, they point out, is valued primarily because it appears to be a
necessary condition for patient autonomy, the unstated assumption being
that the open expression of the counselor's values undermines clients'
abilities to make their own decisions. Wachbroit and Wasserman challenge
that assumption, arguing that clients are not that fragile, and also that
unspoken social biases may be more autonomy-threatening than those which
are clearly put on the table.43 However, even this useful separation cannot
extricate us fully from our dilemma. If a deaf couple approached a counselor
looking not only for information but for practical assistance in creating a
deaf child, the counselor might not be satisfied with a solution in which she
expressed her moral reservations and then went on to help them anyway.
What Nance and Caplan seek is a principled argument on which to base a
refusal for assistance. This refusal need not rise to a legal prohibition, but
41. Walter Nance, Parables, in BARTELS, PRESCRmiNG OuR FuruRE, supra note 1, at
92.
42. Robert Wachbroit & David Wasserman, Patient Autonomy and Value-Neutrality in
Nondirective Genetic Counseling, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 103, 103-112 (1995).
43. Id. at 108-09.
1997]
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could become part of the ethical norms and standard of care for the
counseling profession.
44
C. Three Genetic Dilemmas.
(1) The first example of a dilemma occasioned by the new technology
has been alluded to above: parents who wish to use the tools of genetics to
ensure that they will have only children who share their disabilities. In
addition to deaf parents, parents with achondroplasia (dwarfism) have
expressed interest in such techniques, not only because it is difficult for
dwarf parents to care for and discipline young children who tower over
them, but also because people with achondroplasia tend to socialize
primarily within a culture made up of other "little people."'45
(2) Another example is the controversy that surrounds testing of
children for adult-onset genetic disease, e.g., Huntington's Disease ("HD").
HD, which tends to attack people in their 40s and 50s, is a neurological
disorder which ends in dementia and paralysis. It is autosomal dominant,
meaning that if one parent has the gene, each child has a fifty per cent
chance of having the disease; there is no cure, and no way to delay or
mitigate the disease. The vast majority of adults at risk for HD choose not to
be tested.46 However, it is not uncommon for parents to request that their
children be tested; their goals may be to set their minds at rest, to plan for
the future, and so on.47 Should geneticists respect the parents' role as
medical decision maker for their children by acceding to their wishes and
testing the child, or should they insist that testing be postponed until the
child is an adult and can make her own choices?
(3) A final dilemma has to do with sex selection. The technology
described above makes it easier for parents to decide the sex of their
offspring, without recourse to abortion. Critics of sex selection (when not
used to avoid a sex-linked disease) object that it turns children into
44. Jeffrey R. Botkin, Fetal Privacy and Confidentiality, 25 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 32
(1995).
45. Natalie Angier, Questions Seen on Tests for Growth Mutations, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 1,
1994, at C7. See also Lois Shepherd, Protecting Parents' Freedom to Have Children with
Genetic Differences, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 761,762 n.2 (1995).
46. David Craufurd, Uptake of Presymptomatic Predictive Testing for Huntington's
Disease, THE LANCET, Sept. 9, 1989, at 603.
47. The Genetic Testing of Children (REPORT OF A WORKING PARTY OF THE CLINICAL
GENETIcs SocIETY, UK), 31 J. MED. GENETIcs 785, 786 (1994); Diane E. Hoffmann & Eric
A. Wulfsberg, Testing Children for Genetic Predispositions: Is It in Their Best Interest?, 23 J.
L. MED. & ETHics 331 (1995).
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commodities,4 8 that it could skew the cultural and political patterns of
society,4 9 and that it tends to express and perpetuate a sexist preference for
boys. 50 But a significant percentage of genetic counselors (a majority of
American counselors, in one study) have supported clients' right to use the
techniques of amniocentesis and abortion to choose the sex of their
children.51
IV. THE CHILD'S RIGHT TO AN OPEN FUTURE
When moral challenges arise in the clinical practice of genetics, they
tend to be understood as conflicts between the obligation to respect patient
autonomy and other ethical norms, such as doing good and avoiding harm.
Thus, a typical counseling dilemma exists when a person who has been
tested and found to be carrying the gene for Tay-Sachs disease refuses to
share that information with siblings and other relatives despite the clear
benefits to them of having that knowledge, 52 or when a family member
declines to participate in a testing protocol necessary to help another
member discover his or her genetic status.
53
This way of looking at moral issues in genetic counseling often leaves
both the counselors and commentators frustrated, for two reasons. First, by
elevating respect for patient autonomy above all other values,54 it may be
difficult to give proper weight to other factors, such as human suffering.
Second, by privileging patient autonomy and by defining the patient as the
person or couple who has come for counseling, there seems no "space" in
48. GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTIICIAL WOMBS 188, 188-200 (1985).
49. AMITAI ETZION, THE GENETIC FIX 101-33 (1973).
50. MICHAEL BAYLES, REPRODUCTIVE ETHICS 34-36 (1984); John Fletcher & Dorothy
Wertz, Ethics, Law, and Medical Genetics: After the Human Genome is Mapped, 39 EMORY
LJ. 747,788 (1990) [hereinafter Fletcher & Wertz, Ethics, Law, and Medical Genetics].
51. In a study of medical geneticists in the United States and abroad, a majority in the
United States said they would perform the diagnosis of sex for a couple planning to abort the
"wrong sex" fetus, or would refer the couple to someone who would. Fletcher & Wertz,
Ethics, Law, and Medical Genetics, supra note 50, at 772-73.
52. Laurence R. Tancredi, Collection and Disclosure of Genetic Information, in THE
GENETIC FRONTIER 49, 67 (Mark S. Frankel & Albert H. Teich eds., 1994).
53. Bonnie S. LeRoy, When Theory Meets Practice: Challenges to the Field of Genetic
Counseling, in BARTELS, PRESCRIBING OUR FUTURE, supra note 1, at 44-48.
54. In the Fletcher and Wertz study of geneticists in the United States and abroad
"autonomy was found to be the dominant principle associated with reasoning about clinical
decisionmaking;" this finding was especially strong in the United States. Fletcher & Wertz,
Ethics, Law, and Medical Genetics, supra note 50, at 776.
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which to give proper attention to the moral claims of the future child who is
the endpoint of many counseling interactions.
To describe the challenge primarily as one that pits beneficence
(concern for the child's quality of life) against autonomy (concern for the
parents' right to make their own decisions about these matters) makes for
obvious difficulties and frustrations.55 These are two very different values,
and comparing and weighing them invites the proverbial analogy of "apples
and oranges." In fact, the perennial critique of a principle-based ethics is that
it offers few suggestions for ordering principles when duties conflict. 56
Further, beneficence and respect for autonomy are values that will always
exist in some tension within the field of genetic counseling. For all the
reasons I listed above, counselors are committed to nondirective counseling.
But surely, most or all of them are drawn to the field because they want to
help people avoid or at least mitigate suffering. This is becoming
increasingly true as training programs in genetic counseling shift the
practice from a research to a social work model.57
Faced with the ethical challenges of our new genetic capabilities, I
suggest a different way to look at these problems. I propose that, rather than
conceptionalizing them as a conflict between autonomy and beneficence, we
recast it as a conflict between parental autonomy and the child's potential
autonomy: what Joel Feinberg has called "the child's right to an open
future."58
Feinberg begins his discussion of children's rights by noticing that
rights can ordinarily be divided into four kinds. First, there are rights that
adults and children have in common (the right not to be killed, for
55. An innovative approach to the question of parents who decline to avail themselves
of steps that would avoid the conception and/or birth of a disabled fetus is presented by Lois
Shepherd. Shepherd argues for a "right to attachment," based on the claim that making
decisions for their children is part of the parental-fetal bonding process, and "failure to respect
the boundaries around the parental-fetal relationship weakens the ties between parent and
child that are so important for the child's development and well-being." Shepherd, supra note
45, at 798-99. It is not clear whether Shepherd is arguing only for the right of parents with
inherited disorders to "let nature take its course," or also for the right to take positive steps to
ensure a disorder. Id. If the latter, I find her argument unsatisfactory because it ignores an
essential element of ethical parenting: respect for the child as an independent entity. See infra
notes 134-47 and accompanying text.
56. Albert R. Jonsen, Foreword to A MATrER OF PRINCIPLES?: FERMENT IN U.S.
BIOETHICS ix (Edwin R. DuBose et al. eds., 1994).
57. Joan H. Marks, The Training of Genetic Counselors, in BARTELS, PRESCRIBING OUR
FUTURE, supra note 1, at 16.
58. Feinberg, supra note 5, at 125.
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example). 59 Second, there are rights which are generally possessed only by
children (or by "childlike" adults).60 These "dependency-rights," as
Feinberg calls them, derive from the child's dependence on others for such
basics as food, shelter, and protection.61 Third, there are rights which can
only be exercised by adults (or at least by children approaching adulthood),
e.g., the free exercise of religion.62 Finally, there are rights which Feinberg
calls "rights-in-trust," rights which are to be "saved for the child until he is
an adult."'63 These rights can be violated by adults now, in ways that cut off
the possibility that the child, when it achieves adulthood, can exercise them.
A striking example is the right to reproduce. A young child cannot
physically exercise that right, and a teenager might lack the legal and moral
grounds on which to assert such a right-but clearly the child, when he or
she attains adulthood, will have that right. Therefore the child now has the
right not to be sterilized, so that the child may exercise that right in the
future. Rights in this category include virtually all the important rights we
believe adults have, but which must be protected now to be exercised later.
Grouped together, they constitute what Feinberg calls, "the child's right to
an open future." 6
4
Feinberg illustrates this concept with two examples, moving from the
relatively uncontroversial to the more difficult. The less controversial
instance is that of the Jehovah's Witness child who needs a blood
transfusion to save his life, but whose parents object on religious grounds. 65
In this case, the parents' right to act upon their religious beliefs and to raise
their family within the religion of their choice conflicts with the child's right
to live to adulthood and to make his own life-or-death decisions. As the
Supreme Court said in another, less defensible, decision involving Jehovah's
Witnesses:
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow
that they are free in identical circumstances to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can
make that decision for themselves. 66
59. Id. at 124-25.
60. Id. at 125.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 125-26.
64. Id. at 124.
65. Id. at 130.
66. Id. at 129 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)). Of course,
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The second example is more difficult. In 1972, in a famous Supreme
Court case, a group of Old Order Amish argued that they should be exempt
from Wisconsin's requirement that all children attend school until they are
either sixteen or graduate from high school.67 The Amish did not have to
send their children to public school; they were free to create a private school
of their own liking.68 But they framed the issue in the most stark manner: to
send their children to any school, past 8th grade, would be antithetical to
their religion and their way of life, and might even result in the death of their
culture.
69
The case was framed as a freedom of religion claim on the one hand,
and the state's right to insist on an educated citizenry on the other.70 Within
that framework, the Amish won.71 First, they were able to persuade the
Court that sending their children to school after 8th grade would potentially
destroy their community:
because it takes them away from their community, physically and
emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life.
During this period, the children must acquire Amish attitudes favoring
manual work and self-reliance and the specific skills needed to perform the
adult role of an Amish farmer or housewife. In the Amish belief higher
learning tends to develop values they reject as influences that alienate man
from God.
72
few cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses present such clear issues, and I do not mean to
suggest that actual cases are rarely controversial. In fact, the case Feinberg chooses to focus
on is much less clearcut. It is the mother who needs the transfusion and is refusing it for
herself on religious grounds; the question is whether the state can override her refusal for the
sake of the three children she will leave behind and who presumably would be better off if
their mother lived to see them grow up. Id. at 130.
I termed the Court's decision in Prince "less defensible" because the facts in that case
involved a nine-year-old girl who was engaged with her aunt in handing out Jehovah's
Witness tracts on a street comer in the early evening. Prince, 321 U.S. at 161-62. Hardly an
example of "martyrdom"!
67. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 209.
70. Id. at 213.
71. Id. at 234.
72. Id. at 211-12.
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Second, the Amish convinced the Court that the state's concerns-that
children be prepared to participate in the political and economic life of the
state-did not apply in this case.73 The Court listened favorably to expert
witnesses who explained that the Amish system of home-based vocational
training-learning from your parent-worked well for that community, that
the community itself was prosperous, and that few Amish were likely to end
up unemployed. 74 The Court said:
the value of all education must be assessed in terms of its capacity to prepare
the child for life. It is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year
or two beyond the eighth grade may be necessary when its goal is the
preparation of the child for life in modem society as the majority live, but it
is quite another if the goal of education [can] be viewed as the preparation of
the child for life in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of
the Amish faith.
7 5
What only a few Justices saw was that the children themselves were
largely ignored in this argument. The Amish wanted to preserve their way of
life. The State of Wisconsin wanted to make sure that its citizens could vote
wisely and make a living. By claiming that leaving school at eighth grade is
not significantly different than leaving at age sixteen, the Justices ducked the
question of whether the liberal democratic state owes all its citizens,
especially children, a right to a basic education that can serve as a building
block if the child decides later in life that she wishes to become an astronaut,
a playwright, or perhaps to join the army. 7 6 As we constantly hear from
politicians and educators, without a high school diploma one's future is
closed. By denying them a high school education or its equivalent, parents
are virtually ensuring that their children will remain housewives and
agricultural laborers. Even if the children agree, is that a choice parents
ought to be allowed to make for them?
Feinberg is right to question the Court's reasoning. I go further than
Feinberg, however, for I argue that the case was decided wrongly. If
Wisconsin had good reasons for settling on high school graduation or age
sixteen as the legal minimum to which children are entitled, then the Amish
children were entitled to that minimum as well, despite their parents'
objections. In deciding the issue primarily on grounds that the Amish were
73. .d. at 222.
74. Id. at 223-29.
75. Id. at 222.
76. Id. at 239-40 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
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not likely to create problems for the state if allowed to keep their children
out of school, the Court reflected a rather minimalist form of liberalism. In
fact, the abiding interest of this case for many political philosophers lies in
the deep conflict it highlights between two different concepts of liberalism:
commitment to autonomy and commitment to diversity,77 a discussion given
new dimensions by the publication of John Rawls' Political Liberalism.
78
William Galston, for example, argues that:
A standard liberal view (or hope) is that these two principles go together and
complement one another: the exercise of autonomy yields diversity, while
the fact of diversity protects and nourishes autonomy. By contrast, my ...
view is that these principles do not always, perhaps even do not usually,
cohere; that in practice, they point in quite different directions in currently
disputed areas such as education .... Specifically: the decision to throw state
power behind the promotion of individual autonomy can weaken or
undermine individuals and groups that do not and cannot organize their
affairs in accordance with that principle without undermining the deepest
sources of their identity.
79
Galston goes on to assert that "properly understood, liberalism is about the
protection of diversity, not the valorization of choice .... To place an ideal
of autonomous choice ... at the core of liberalism is in fact to narrow the
range of possibilities available within liberal societies."80 Against Galston, I
argue that the autonomy of the individual is ethically superior to the
autonomy of the group. Both ideals have powerful claims on us, but when
group rights would extinguish the abilities of the individuals within them to
make their own life choices, then the liberal state must support the
individual against the group. This is especially crucial when the individual at
issue is a child, who is particularly vulnerable to adult coercion, and
therefore has particular claims on our protection. Unfortunately, of course, it
is precisely where children are concerned that groups, understandably, most
jealously protect their prerogatives to guide and make decisions. The Amish
are an example of a group guarding its ability to shape the lives of its
children and to assure the survival of the group; Deaf parents wishing to
ensure Deaf children are an example of families pursuing the same goals. Of
course, groups and families ought to-in fact, they must-strive to shape the
77. William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHics 516 (April 1995).
78. JoHN RAwLs, PoLmcA LmERAisM (1993).
79. Galston, supra note 77, at 521.
80. Id. at 523.
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values and lives of the children in their care. Not to do so would lead to
social and individual pathology. But when that shaping takes the form of a
radically narrow range of choices available to the child when she grows
up-when it impinges substantially on the child's right to an open future-
then I maintain that liberalism requires us to intervene to support the child's
future ability to make its own choices about which of the many diverse
visions of life it wishes to embrace.
V. CHOOSING FOR DISABILITY: IS CREATING A DEAF CHILD A HARM?
A. The Wrongful Life Problem: A Red Herring
Returning to the discussion of genetic dilemmas, we confront two
distinct issues. First, in what sense is it ever possible to do harm by giving
birth to a child who would otherwise not have been born at all? Second, is
being deaf, rather than hearing, in fact a harm?
The first issue can be termed the problem of wrongful life. Imagine a
couple: Carl and Karla. They are each deaf, with a form of hereditary,
recessive deafness. With every pregnancy they face a one in four chance of
producing a deaf child. Further imagine that this form of deafness can be
detected by genetic testing. Knowing the odds, Carl and Karla decide simply
to get pregnant and take their chances. One can expect that they would face
some criticism for their decision, especially if the decision were "made
public" by their actually having a deaf child. One argument made against
them might be that they ought not to burden society with the extra needs of a
deaf child if the situation could have been avoided. This argument is easy to
refute, as deaf people are fully capable of becoming productive members of
society.
But what about the second kind of argument: that for them to have a
deaf child is wrong for the sake of the child itself? As Steinbock and
McClamrock explain, this kind of claim can be sustained only in very
horrible instances, because it relies on the assertion that the child's life will
be so terrible that it would have been better off if it had not been born.8 1
Remember that this particular child, call her Carol, could either be born deaf
or not be at all. Deafness was a part of her DNA. Had her parents taken steps
to avoid a deaf child, they would have had a different child altogether, not
Carol. There may be perspectives from which we can argue that their
laissez-faire approach was morally wrong, but we cannot claim to be
81. Bonnie Steinbock & Ronald McClamrock, When Is Birth Unfair to the Child?, 24
HASTnNGS CTR. REP. 15 (Nov.-Dec. 1994).
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arguing that from Carol's perspective (unless we are prepared to argue that
being deaf is literally a fate worse than nonexistence).
For clarity's sake, imagine another instance: a couple who is deaf for
nongenetic reasons. This couple, of course, has no more likelihood than the
general population of giving birth to a deaf child. If they want to ensure, or
at least, increase their chances of having a deaf child, they will have to
deliberately expose it to some teratogen like German measles. In this case, it
is easier to argue that the child, call her Ann, has been harmed. Baby Ann
had two possibilities: being born hearing or being born deaf. Her parents
deliberately did something to ensure the latter condition. If (and this is
something we still need to address) being deaf is less desirable than being
able to hear, then Ann has been harmed.
Now imagine a third scenario. Again, we have Carl and Karla who each
carry a recessive gene for deafness. For unrelated reasons, this couple needs
to make use of in vitro fertilization to become pregnant. Like most couples
using IVF, they try to produce a number of embryos, only some of which
will be implanted. They decide to use preimplantation diagnosis and implant
only those embryos that carry two copies of the gene for deafness. Looking
into the petrie dish, and simplifying the situation somewhat, we see four
embryos: A, B, C, and D. Embryo C has both copies of the deafness gene;
the others do not. Carl and Karla choose to implant only Embryo C, who
emerges nine months later as Carol, a healthy, deaf baby. Has Carol been
harmed? As in the first scenario, Carol had only two possibilities: to be born
deaf or not to have been born at all. It seems hard to argue that Carol has
been harmed in this instance, for the same reasons that she had not been
harmed in the first scenario, where her birth was a matter of chance. And
yet, this is the scenario which so troubles Nance, and which Caplan uses as
an example of an "immoral" use of genetic counseling. If the harm here is
not to Carol, and not to society, who or what has been harmed?
All commentators seem to agree that there is no purely logical way out
of what Dan Brock calls the "wrongful handicap" 82 conundrum. In the case
of a child whose life is arguably not worth living, one can say that life itself
is a cruelty to the child. Steinbock argues that the life of a child with Tay-
Sachs disease fits this category. 83 But when a child is born in less than ideal
circumstances, or is partially disabled in ways that do not make for a life of
horrendous suffering, there seems no way to argue that the child herself has
82. Dan W. Brock, The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms-The Case of
Wrongful Handicaps, 9 BioETHics 269 (1995).
83. Bonnie Steinbock, The Logical Case for "Wrongful Life," 16 HASTINGS CTR. REP.
15 (Apr. 1986).
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been harmed. This may appear to entail the conclusion, counter to our
common moral sense, that therefore no harm has been done "A wrong action
must be bad for someone, but [a] choice to create [a] child with its handicap
is bad for no one."
84
However, most commentators agree that one can still support a moral
critique of the parents' decision. Steinbock and McClamrock argue for a
principle of "parental responsibility" by which being a good parent entails
refraining from bringing a child into the world when one cannot give it
"even a decent chance at a good life." 85 Feinberg appears to agree, arguing
that a parent "acts wrongly" in bringing a handicapped child into the world
if in a month's time she could have conceived a nonhandicapped child,
despite the fact that her wrongdoing harmed no specific person. Brock,
following Parfit, distinguishes same person from same number choices. In
same person choices, the same person exists in each of the alternative
courses of action the agent chooses, but the person may exist more or less
harmed. Thus the parents who deliberately exposed Baby Ann to a deafness-
inducing teratagen made a same person choice. In same number choices,
"the choice affects who, which child, will exist."86 Brock claims that moral
harms can exist in both instances, despite the fact that in same number
choices the moral harm cannot be tied to a specific person. Brock generates
the following principle:
Individuals are morally required not to let any possible child .. .for whose
welfare they are responsible experience serious suffering or limited
opportunity if they can act so that, without imposing substantial burdens or
costs on themselves or others, any alternative possible child ... for whose
welfare they would be responsible will not experience serious suffering or
limited opportunity. 87
While agreeing with Brock, Steinbock and others, I locate the moral
harm differently, at least with respect to disabled persons wishing to
reproduce themselves in the form of a disabled child. Deliberately creating a
child who will be forced irreversibly into the parents' notion of "the good
life" violates the Kantian principle of treating each person as an end in
herself and never as a means only.88 All parenthood exists as a balance
84. Brock, supra note 82, at 271.
85. Steinbock & McClamrock, supra note 81, at 17.
86. Brock, supra note 82, at 272.
87. Id. at 273.
88. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MoRALs 96 (HJ. Paton
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between fulfillment of parental hopes and values and the individual
flowering of the actual child in his or her own direction. The decision to
have a child is never made for the sake of the child-for no child then exists.
We choose to have children for myriad reasons, but before the child is
conceived, those reasons can only be self-regarding. The child is a means to
our ends: a certain kind of joy and pride, continuing the family name, and
fulfillment of religious or societal expectations. But morally the child is first
and foremost an end in herself. Good parenthood requires a balance between
having a child for our own sakes and being open to the moral reality that the
child will exist for her own sake, with her own talents and weaknesses,
propensities and interests, and with her own life to make. Parental practices
which close exits virtually forever are insufficiently attentive to the child as
an end in herself. By closing off the child's right to an open future, they
define the child as an entity who exists to fulfill parental hopes and dreams,
not his own.
B. Is Being Deaf a Harm?
Having evaded the snares of the wrongful life conundrum, we must
tackle the second problem: is being deaf a harm? At first glance, this might
appear as a silly question. Ethically, we would certainly include destroying
someone's hearing under the rubric of "harm"; legally, one could
undoubtedly receive compensation if one were rendered deaf through
someone else's negligence. 89 Many Deaf9° people, however, have recently
been claiming that Deafness is better understood as a cultural identity than
as a disability. 91 Particularly in the wake of the Deaf President Now
revolution at Gallaudet University in March, 1988, which is to Deaf Pride as
the Stonewall Riot is to gays and lesbians, Deaf people have been asserting
their claims not merely to equal access (e.g., through increased technology)
trans., 1964).
89. In one California case, a child was awarded damages against health care providers
who failed to diagnose, prior to this child's conception, that her older sister had been born
with hereditary deafness. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982). Had the parents known
of the sister's condition, they would not have conceived the plaintiff child. Id.
90. I use the upper-case form of "Deaf' here as many Deaf people do, to signify
Deafness as a culture rather than a disability.
91. Kathryn Ivers, Towards a Bilingual Education Policy in the Mainstreaming of Deaf
Children, 26 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 439,441-42 (1995). Ivers argues for "[a] full shift to
the civil rights model" as opposed to a medical or social pathology model, and states that "[in
light of the existence of a full-fledged language and culture, deaf individuals should be
viewed as members of a linguistic minority rather than as handicapped individuals .... Id.
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but also to equal respect as a cultural minority. As one (hearing) reporter
noted:
So strong is the feeling of cultural solidarity that many deaf parents cheer on
discovering that their baby is deaf. Pondering such a scene, a hearing person
can experience a kind of vertigo. The surprise is not simply the unfamiliarity
of the views; it is that, as in a surrealist painting, jarring notions are
presented as if they were commonplace.
92
From this perspective, the use of cochlear implants to enable deaf children
to hear93 or the abortion of deaf fetuses, is characterized as "genocide.
'94
Deaf pride advocates point out that as Deaf people they lack the ability to
hear, but they also have many positive gains: a cohesive community, a rich
cultural heritage built around the various residential schools, 95 a growing
body of drama, poetry and other artistic traditions ,96 and, of course, what
makes all this possible: sign.97 Roslyn Rosen, the president of the National
Association of the Deaf, is Deaf, the daughter of Deaf parents and the
mother of Deaf children. "I'm happy with who I am," she says, "and I don't
want to be 'fixed.' Would an Italian-American rather be a WASP? In our
society everyone agrees that whites have an easier time than blacks. But do
you think a black person would undergo operations to become white?"
'98
On the other side of the argument, there is evidence that deafness is a
very serious disability. Deaf people have incomes thirty to forty percent
92. Edward Dolnick, Deafness as Culture, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 1993, at 38.
93. Cochlear implants are permanent surgical hearing aids which the medical
community considers to be a highly recommended intervention for profoundly deaf adults
and children. NIH Consensus Development Panel on Cochlear Implants in Adults and
Children, 274 J.A.M.A.1955 (1995).
94. Amy Elizabeth Brusky, Comment, Making Decisions for Deaf Children Regarding
Cochlear Implants: The Legal Ramifications of Recognizing Deafness as a Culture Rather
than a Disability, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 235, 241-42 (1995).
95. CAROL PADDEN & TOM HUMPHRIES, DEAF IN AMERICA: VOICES FROM A CULTURE
(1988).
96. Ivers, supra note 91, at 469.
97. John Christiansen, Sociological Implications of Hearing Loss, GENETICS OF
HEARING IMPAIRMENT (ANNALS OF THE NEw YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCE) 230 (1991). The
neurologist Oliver Sacks says, "[s]ign is the equal of speech, lending itself equally to the
rigorous and the poetic-to philosophical analysis or to making love-indeed, with an ease
that is sometimes greater than that of speech." OLIVER SACKS, SEEING VOICES: A JOURNEY
INTO THE WORLD OF THE DEAF 20 (1989).
98. Dolnick, supra note 92, at 38.
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below the national average.99 The state of education for the deaf is
unacceptable by anyone's standards; the typical deaf student graduates from
high school unable to read a newspaper. 100 Even among the brightest and
most able deaf students, one reads heartbreaking accounts of the difficulties
involved in tasks as simple as trying to sell an ad for the student
yearbook. 101
However, one could also point to the lower incomes and inadequate
state of education among some racial and ethnic minorities in our country, a
situation we do not (or at least ought not) try to ameliorate by eradicating
minorities. Deaf advocates often cite the work of Nora Ellen Groce, whose
oral history of Martha's Vineyard, Everyone Here Spoke Sign Language,
tells a fascinating story. 102 For over two hundred years, ending in the middle
of the 20th century, the Vineyard experienced a degree of hereditary
deafness exponentially higher than that of the mainland103 Although the
number of deaf people was low in noncomparative terms (one in 155), the
result was a community in which deaf people participated fully in the
political and social life of the island, had an economic prosperity on par with
their neighbors, and communicated easily with the hearing population, for
"everyone here spoke sign language."'
10 4
So endemic was Sign for the general population of the Island that
hearing Islanders often exploited its unique properties even in the absence of
deaf people. 10 5 Old-timers told Groce stories of spouses communicating
through Sign when they were outdoors and did not want to raise their voices
against the wind.10 6 Or men might turn away and finish a "dirty" joke in
Sign when a woman walked into the general store. 107 At church, deaf
parishioners gave their testimony in Sign.
10 8
As one Deaf activist said, in a comment that could have been directly
related to the Vineyard experience, "When Gorbachev visited the U.S., he
used an interpreter to talk to the President. Was Gorbachev disabled?"10 9
99. NORA ELLEN GROCE, EvERYONE HERE SPOKE SIGN LANGUAGE: HEREDITARY
DEAFNESS ON MARTHA'S VINEYARD 85 (1985).
100. Andrew Solomon, Defiantly Deaf, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 28, 1994, at 43.
101. LEAH COHEN, TRAIN Go SoRRY: INSIDE A DEAF WORLD 167-70 (1995).
102. GROCE, supra note 99.
103. John W. M. Whiting, Foreword, in GROCE, supra note 99.
104. Id. at 3.
105. Id. at 4.
106. Id. at 65-66.
107. Id. at 67.
108. Id. at 62.
109. Dolnick, supra note 92, at 43.
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Further, one might argue that, since it is impossible to eradicate deafness
completely, even if that were a worthy goal, the cause of deaf equality is
better served when parents who are proud to be Deaf deliberately have Deaf
children who augment and strengthen the existing population.
Many of the problems that deaf people experience are the result of being
born, without advance warning, to hearing parents. When there is no reason
to anticipate the birth of a deaf child, it is often months or years before the
child is correctly diagnosed. Meanwhile, she grows up in a world devoid of
language, unable even to communicate with her parents. When the diagnosis
is made, her parents must first deal with the emotional shock, and then sort
through the plethora of conflicting advice on how best to raise and educate
their child. Most probably, they have never met anyone who is deaf. If they
choose the route recommended by most Deaf activists and raise their child
with sign language, it will take the parents years to learn American Sign
Language ("ASL"). Meanwhile, their child has missed out on the crucial
development of language at the developmentally appropriate time, a lack
associated with poor reading skills and other problems later.
1 10
Further, even the most accepting of hearing parents often feel locked in
conflict with the Deaf community over who knoWs what is best for their
child. 111 If Deafness truly is a culture, rather than a disability, then raising a
Deaf child is somewhat like white parents trying to raise a black child in
contemporary America (with a background chorus of black activists trying
to tell them that they can not possibly make a good job of it!). 112 Residential
110. Id. at 40.
111. Solomon, supra note 100, at 65.
112. Deaf parents who are taken aback to find themselves with a hearing baby may
exhibit many of the same fears, in reverse. The following is from an interview with a deaf
woman, describing the birth of her daughter:
When Barbara was born, it wasn't until about three days later that I had this funny
feeling about her. I started wondering if she was deaf or hearing .... My first child. I
kept wondering to myself, Is she deaf or is she hearing? I was holding her in my arms
near the metal food tray. I picked up a spoon and dropped it on the tray. I couldn't
believe it! I was really upset. I did it a second time because I just couldn't believe it. I
dropped the spoon again, and it was the same thing. I even did it a third time. I
thought, Oh, my God, she's hearing! What am I going to do? I have a hearing
daughter! My husband came in and I said, My God, our daughter's hearing! He was
just as surprised but he told me it was fine, it was going to be okay. I'm the third
generation deaf. There was no question but that we would have deaf children. Then I
find out that my daughter was born hearing! What on earth am I going to do with
her? I don't even know how to talk to her. ["So you never thought that you might
have a hearing child?"] No, never! It never occurred to me that my child would be
hearing. I was really surprised. I was scared. I wanted to be close to my children. I've
1997]
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schools, for example, which can be part of the family culture for a Deaf
couple, can be seen by hearing parents as Dickensian nightmares or, worse,
as a "cultlike" experience in which their children will be lost to them
forever.
113
By contrast, deaf children born to Deaf parents, "Deaf of Deaf' as they
say, learn language (Sign) at the same age as hearing children. They are
welcomed into their families and inculcated into Deaf culture in the same
way as any other children are welcome into their own culture. By all
accounts and perhaps for these reasons, the Deaf of Deaf are the
acknowledged leaders of the Deaf Pride movement, and the academic creme
de la creme. In evaluating the parental choice to deliberately ensure having
Deaf children, one must remember that the statistics and descriptions of deaf
life in America are largely reflective of the experience of deaf children born
to hearing parents, who make up the vast majority of deaf people today. 114
If Deafness is a culture rather than a disability, it is an exceedingly
narrow one. One factor that does not seem clear is the extent to which
children raised with ASL as their first language will ever be comfortable
with the written word. 115 At present, the conflicted and politicized state of
education for the deaf, along with the many hours spent (many would say
wasted) 116 attempting to teach deaf children oral skills, makes it impossible
to know what is to blame for the dismal reading and writing skills of the
average deaf person. 117 Some deaf children raised with ASL from birth do
become skilled readers, but there is reason to question whether a deaf child
has access to the wealth of literature, drama, and poetry that liberals would
like to consider every child's birthright.
Although Deaf activists correctly show that many occupations are open
to the deaf with only minor technological adjustments, the range of
occupations will always be inherently limited. It is unlikely that the world
always been very close to my family, and I wanted the same for me and my children.
The Hearing world and the Deaf world are such separate worlds. I worried that we
would never connect, or that we would drift apart.
PAUL PRESTON, MOTHER FATHER DEAF: LIvING BETWEEN SOUND AND SILENCE 17 (1994)
113. Dolnick, supra note 92, at 52.
114. "[O]ver 90 percent of the prevocationally deaf have two hearing parents." BERYL
LEFF BENDERLY, DANCING WITHOUT Music: DEAFNESS IN AMERICA 12 (1990).
115. ASL itself has no written analogue, and has a completely different grammatical
structure from English.
116. Ben Gose, Pride vs. Practicality: Critics of Gallaudet say Its Emphasis on Deaf
Identity Leaves Students Illiterate, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, March 29, 1996, at
A53-54.
117. Id. See also Ivers, supra note 91, at 465-66; Dolnick, supra note 92, at 40.
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will become like Martha's Vineyard, where everyone knew Sign. This
narrow choice of vocation is not only a harm for its own sake but also is
likely to continue to lead to lower standards of living.
118
C. Choosing for Disability and the Child's Right to an Open Future
If deafness is a disability which substantially narrows a child's career,
marriage, and cultural options in the future, then deliberately creating a deaf
child counts as a moral harm. If Deafness is a culture, as Deaf activists
assert, then deliberately creating a Deaf child who will have only limited
options to move outside of that culture also counts as a moral harm. 119 A
decision made before a child is born that confines her forever to a narrow
group of people and a limited choice of careers, so violates the child's right
to an open future that no genetic counselor should acquiesce to it. The very
value of autonomy that grounds the ethics of genetic counseling should
preclude assisting parents in such a decision.
VI. CHILDHOOD TESTING FOR LATE-ONSET GENETIC DISEASES 120
A. The Problem
A number of serious genetic diseases do not show themselves until
fairly late in life. A person with HD, for example, does not usually begin to
exhibit symptoms of the disease until the fourth or fifth decade of life.
12 1
118. Certainly one reason why the Vineyard deaf had the same level of prosperity as
their hearing neighbors was that farming and fishing were just about the only occupations
available.
119. Even Galston, who argues that liberalism is about the protection of diversity
rather than of individual autonomy, begins with the presumption that society must "defend..
. the liberty not to be coerced into, or trapped within, ways of life. Id. Accordingly, the state
must safeguard the ability of individuals to shift allegiances and cross boundaries." Galston,
supra note 77, at 522.
120. This issue was brought to my attention by Ronald M. Green and Thomas H.
Murray.
121. Huntington's disease is a movement disorder-causing uncontrollable jerking
and writhing movements of all parts of the body, called chorea. Even more
distressing to patients and families than the obvious movements, it is preceded or
accompanied by cognitive changes leading to profound and frequently severe
emotional disturbances, suicidal depression and occasionally hallucinations and
delusions. The disease runs a course of about fifteen to twenty-five years and is
inevitably fatal .... No treatments are known beyond some marginal and temporary
palliation for the movements and antidepressants for the psychiatric symptoms.
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New genetic knowledge has enabled scientists to devise tests for some of
these diseases and for genetic predispositions to diseases, 122 with many
more advances on the horizon. So, for example, someone whose parent had
HD and who is thus at a fifty percent risk of inheriting the gene (and
therefore the disease), can be tested at any point after conception. The
advantages to this kind of testing are obvious. Persons at risk can now make
reproductive decisions knowing whether or not they will get HD and if they
are at risk of passing it on to their children. The fifty percent who do not
carry the gene will, presumably, be more relaxed and hopeful about the
future, and will not interpret every passing hand tremor as the first sign of
incipient HD. 123 However, in the twenty years in which HD testing has been
available, 124 a number of disadvantages have become obvious as well.
Discovering that one definitely has HD can lead to depression,125 social
Huntington's disease is a product of a gene transmitted in an autosomally dominant
inheritance pattern-in other words, a gene that occurs on one of the twenty-two
human chromosomes and whose effect dominates its normal partner. It is entirely
penetrant, which means that if a gene carrier lives long enough, the disease is
inexorably expressed.
Wexler, supra note 14, at 212.
122. Tests are currently available for predispositions to breast, colon, and thyroid
cancer, as well as melanoma. Testing is also possible for familial Alzheimer Disease, although
the Medical and Scientific Advisory Committee for Alzheimer Disease International has
reached a consensus that the tests are not yet ready to be offered to the public. MEDICAL AND
SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE INTERNATIONAL, Consensus
Statement on Predictive Testing for Alzheimer Disease, 9 ALZHEIMER DISEASE AND
ASSOCIATED DISORDERS 182 (1995).
123. [T]he symptoms [of HD] can begin at any time, from very early to very late.
So the worry is essentially lifelong. Every clumsy movement, every slight stumble,
any momentary slurring of speech or fleeting unsteadiness of gait-trivial events
most people would ignore-will, in the individual at risk for HD, arouse
apprehensions: Is this it? Does the inexorable decline now begin?
Albert Rosenfeld, At Risk for Huntington's Disease: Who Should Know What and When?, 14
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5 (June 1984).
124. The first presymptomatic test for HD was developed and offered to the public on
a research basis in 1986. Catherine A. Hayes, Genetic Testing For Huntington's Disease-A
Family Issue, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1449 (1992).
125. In one 1984 study, patients with HD (diagnosed by symptoms and family history,
not by DNA) were more likely to commit suicide than the general population. Miriam
Schoenfeld et al., Increased rate of suicide among patients with Huntington's disease, 47 J.
OF NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY, AND PSYCHIATRY 1283 (1984). Unfortunately, in my
opinion, the medical literature persists in describing suicide as a "risk," rather than as a
rational choice.
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stigma, 126 and problems with insurance and employment. 127 Even knowing
that one does not have the gene can lead to "survivor guilt" and serious
psychological problems if one or more of one's siblings were not so
lucky. 128 Thus, only fifteen percent of adults at risk have availed themselves
of the opportunity to be tested and discover their status. 129
This mixed reaction to the option of pre-symptomatic testing raises a
difficult ethical question: how should health care providers respond to
requests from parents who wish to have their children tested for adult-onset
disorders for which there is no medical intervention1 30 ? At present, there is
a consensus developing in the United Kingdom that predictive genetic
testing of children "should generally not be undertaken" if there are no
useful medical interventions. 131 In the United States, it is too early to claim
that a consensus has been reached, but opinion appears to be leaning toward
the "no-test" position.
132
B. Presymptomatic Testing and the Child's Right to an Open Future
There are many reasons why parents may request presymptomatic
genetic testing of children for adult-onset diseases, even in the absence of
any useful medical intervention. 133 Parents may hope for a reduction in their
126. Wexler, supra note 14, at 234.
127. Henry T. Greely, Health Insurance, Employment Discrimination, and the
Genetics Revolution, in THE CODE OF CODES, supra note 14, at 264.
128. Wexler, supra note 14, at 236.
129. Genetic Testing of Children, supra note 47.
130. If some ameliorating intervention were possible, the ethical issue would become
quite clear, as testing would almost certainly be in the child's best interest.
131. Theresa M. Marteau, Editorial, The Genetic Testing of Children, 31 J. MED.
GENr'MCS 743 (1994). See also Sheila McLean, Genetic Screening of Children: The UX.
Position, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 117 (1995). This is a consensus of ethicists and
working groups focused on this issue, not of practicing physicians and geneticists. For
example, a 1993 survey in the U.K. showed that a majority of pediatricians and a substantial
minority of geneticists would test children at the parents' request for late-onset genetic
disorders or for unaffected carrier status. Dorothy Wertz et al., Genetic Testing for Children
and Adolescents: Who Decides?, 272 JAMA 875 (1994). Presumably, the publication of
policy statements by professional societies will bring the majority of medical practice into
conformity with those guidelines.
132. ASHG/ACMG Report, Points to Consider: Ethical, Legal, and Psychosocial
Implications of Genetic Testing in Children and Adolescents, 57 AM. J. HuM. GENErIcS 1233
(1995) (Report of the American Society of Human Genetics Board of Directors and the
American College of Medical Genetics Board of Directors).
133. Excluded from this category, of course, are diseases for which medical
monitoring in childhood is shown to be helpful in catching the disease early. Conversely,
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own uncertainty and anxiety, or they may use the information to make
decisions about whether or not to have more children or how to space
subsequent pregnancies. Parents may want to take genetic predictions into
account as they allocate resources for higher education 134 or consider other
kinds of long-range planning. 135 One genetics center had a man request
testing of his grandchildren in order to decide how to write his will.
136
There is, of course, a strong tradition in Anglo-American law and
culture of allowing parents great latitude in making medical decisions for
their children. Although exceptions to that rule have been made with respect
to mature minors, 137 in research protocols, 138 or when parents' decisions
put children at great risk of losing their lives or their health, 139 it is still
generally the case that a parental decision is considered both necessary and
sufficient for providing medical care for minor children. This tradition
began with the pre-twentieth century doctrine that the child was the father's
property. Today it rests on two assumptions: that the parents are the persons
most able to make a decision about the well-being and best interests of their
children, 140 and also that making decisions about children's education,
medical care, and so on, is part of the autonomy rights of parents as heads of
knowing that the child does not have the gene for disease can spare the child burdensome and
unnecessary monitoring. ASHG/ACMG Report, supra note 132, at 1234-35.
134. Id. at 1236.
135. Another reason to have a child tested, perhaps as a teenager, might be to avoid
the psychological disruption of living an "at risk" role that is later repudiated. Nancy Wexler,
reporting on a pilot testing program with extensive counseling begun at the College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia University, notes that,
It is almost as inconceivable for people to learn that they are not in harm's way.
Identities have been built around being 'at risk': commitments abandoned, lives led
in the fast lane. Some people who learn that they are free of the long-dreaded gene
are stunned and unprepared. Suddenly they are ordinary; vulnerable now to other
diseases, responsible for their lives as never before. Friends and relatives who had
sacrificed for them in the past may feel cheated and vengeful or disturbed to find
themselves deprived of their role of tending to an invalid.
Nancy S. Wexler, The Tiresias Complex: Huntington's Disease as a Paradigm of Testing for
Late-onset Disorders, 6 FASEB J. 2820, 2823 (1992).
136. Judith Granbois & Gal Vance, Ethical Issues in Late Onset Genetic Disorders:
Cases and Methods, Presentation Before the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics
(APPE) (March 1996).
137. ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF
SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 241 (1989).
138. ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINIcAL RESEARCH 162 (1981).
139. BARRY FURRoW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 741 (1995).
140. BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 137, at 233.
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their families. 14 1 Thus, when a genetic test has been placed before the
public, geneticists are up against a powerful presumption if they refuse
parental requests.
Geneticists make a number of arguments against acceding to parental
requests for predictive testing. 142 They fear that a child with a genetic defect
will be subjected to increased medical tests and treatment regimens with no
proven benefit, may suffer a loss of self-esteem, may suffer a loss of privacy
if the diagnosis is disclosed outside the immediate family, may be
stigmatized at school or in future employment, or may have difficulty in
obtaining insurance later in life.
143
The Report of the Boards of Directors of the American Society of
Human Genetics and the American College of Medical Genetics 144 attempts
to resolve this issue by relying on the basic tenet of all medical ethics:
primum non nocere, orfirst do no harm, 14 5 but acknowledges that where the
benefits and harms "are primarily psychosocial rather than medical, such an
assessment may be difficult." 146 Advocates of the parental right to make the
decision rely on "the privacy of the family unit in our culture," and frame
the issue as one of tension between "the beneficence model of patient care
and the rights of parents to their own autonomy and to the protection of their
family units."
147
141. Mary Z. Pelias, Duty to Disclose in Medical Genetics: A Legal Perspective, 39
AM. J. MED. GENETICS 347, 349 (1991).
142. One argument that will not withstand scrutiny is that genetic testing requires
informed consent, and young children are incapable of giving it. This argument would
preclude any pediatric care at all. ASHG/ACMG Report, supra note 132, at 1234.
143. Id. at 1235.
144. This report was also endorsed by the Affiance of Genetic Support Groups, the
Council of Regional Networks for Genetic Services, the International Society of Nurses in
Genetics, the National Society of Genetic Counselors, and the American Academy of
Pediatrics. Id. at 1239.
145. Bettina Schone-Seifert, Harm, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHIcs 1021 (rev. ed.
1995). "The Hippocratic tradition established primum non nocere (above all, do no harm) as
the physician's most important rule of conduct." Id. at 1021. See also Carol Mason Spicer,
Nature and Role of Codes and Other Ethics Directives, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICs 2605
(rev. ed. 1995).
146. ASHG/ACMG Report, supra note 132, at 1238.
147. Pelias, supra note 141, at 347. Pelias also argues that there are legal obligations
on counselors, based on constitutional law, to comply with parental requests for testing. Id.
However, Pelias' assertions are based on a misunderstanding of the difference between
negative rights (against interference by the state) and positive rights (which entitle one to
certain services). Constitutional issues arise when the state intervenes against a parent's
wishes (e.g., forbids parents to send children to religiously-based schools, as in Pierce v.
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In my view, the best way to resolve this issue is by recourse to the
concept of the child's right to an open future. Although the majority of
adults at risk for HD have decided not to be tested, fifteen percent have
chosen the other route. Thus, there is no common answer to the question of
whether life is better lived with or without the knowledge of one's HD
status. Genetic counselors go to great lengths to protect the right of adults to
make the decision for themselves of whether or not to be tested.
148
Obviously, if parents have the child tested, then they preclude the child's
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)), not when the state decides against providing a
service (unless their refusal is based on unconstitutional reasons, such as race).
Ellen W. Clayton does an excellent job of laying the legal issues to rest in Removing the
Shadow of the Law From the Debate About Genetic Testing of Children, 57 AM. J. MED.
GENErTcs 630 (1995). "[A]s we continue to debate the proper roles of physicians, parents, and
children in deciding about genetic testing prior to adulthood, we need to recognize clearly
that, far from conferring sweeping rights on parents to demand these tests, tort and
constitutional law in the United States have little role to play in resolving these dilemmas." Id.
at 633. Although I am in near complete agreement with Clayton, I also think it is important to
note that while the law has little role to play in shaping policy about genetic testing, once
policy has been set, doctors can rely upon it as a "standard of care" which may protect them
from tort litigation. Conversely, a maverick who persists in testing children for late-onset
genetic disease in the face of a consensus in the medical community is more vulnerable if she
is sued (perhaps by a child claiming that the testing caused stigma or depression). The
standard of conduct becomes one of "good medical practice," which is to say, "what is
customary and usual in the profession." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 189 (5th ed. 1984). See also Neil Sharpe, Letter to the Editor,
Presympomatic Testing for Huntington's Disease: Is There a Duty to Test Those Under the
Age of Eighteen Years?, 46 AM. J. MED. GNETcs 250 (1993). Sharpe argues that failure to
advise patients of the availability of a medical procedure may provide a cause of action for
medical malpractice or a breach of the doctrine of informed consent. Id. However, there is
little evidence that geneticists are moving toward a policy of not informing families that the
test is available (which is impractical in any case, since adults know that the test is available
for them); rather, the policy would be to share with families the information that the test
exists, and why the policy discourages or precludes testing of minors. Id. Sharpe's second
point is that this issue should not be decided as a matter of policy, but on a case-by-case basis.
Id.
148. Situations in which testing one person necessarily provides information about
other people's status are particularly troublesome to geneticists, who strenuously protect
people's right to privacy. Catherine Hayes, President of the Huntington's Disease Society of
America, is impliedly critical of researchers who agreed to test one identical twin for HD,
despite the fact that the other twin did not want to know her status. Hayes, supra note 124, at
1450. The twin who wanted to know insisted that she would never reveal the results, but she
did. Id. Since identical twins are genetically identical, the second twin found out her status as
well. Id. Hayes comments, "One person's right to know in this case did not necessarily
outweigh her twin's right not to know. When information was given to one twin, the other
irretrievably lost the freedom to decide." Id.
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right and opportunity to make that decision for himself in adulthood. 149 As
we have seen, for those unfortunate enough to have a family history of a
disease like Huntington's, the decision whether or not to be tested is
profound and complex. Even the lucky half who discover that they do not
have the gene are hardly "home free," psychologically speaking. This is a
decision each individual can only make for herself. Thus, respect for the
child's right to an open future supports the growing consensus in the United
States against offering such tests for children.
VII. SEX SELECTION
A. The Problem
Sex selection through abortion has been available since the advent of
genetic testing by way of amniocentesis, and in some countries, such as
149. A related issue deals with confidentiality. Genetic counselors will protect without
exception the right of individuals not to share their genetic information with others, even in
situations where not sharing the information puts others at risk or limits their options. We
normally do not think of medical confidentiality as an issue between parents and children
(except matters regarding older children and sexual or reproductive questions), because of the
overriding assumption that parents need to know about their children's medical conditions in
order to promote their health and well-being. Thus it would be ludicrous for a doctor to refuse
to share with a parent the results of a child's test for TB or asthma. But in the case of HD,
there is nothing the parent can do to prevent the disease from occurring, and arguably little
the parent can do to prepare the child, younger than eighteen, for a disease that will not strike
until middle age. Thus, it is not clear why the child's incipient right to privacy should not be a
barrier to testing children and informing parents of the results. Jeffrey Botkin makes a related
point with respect to the genetic privacy of the fetus. Jeffrey Botkin, Fetal Privacy and
Confidentiality, 25 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 32 (Sept.-Oct. 1995). "[R]espect for the privacy and
confidentiality of the fetus outweigh parental rights to information about the fetus." Id.
The argument for confidentiality is even stronger with respect to testing children for
possible carrier status for a recessive genetic disease, such as Tay-Sachs. Carrier status has no
implications for one's health, except for reproductive decisions. The right of mature minors,
and certainly of adults, to make their own reproductive decisions is a fixed point in our ethics
and jurisprudence. John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The
Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939 (1986). Thus, a child who
is born into a family with a history of Tay-Sachs Disease needs to be informed about the
problem at an appropriate time. Whether she wishes to be tested to find out her carrier status,
whether she decides to share the results with her parents, and how she uses that information to
make marital and reproductive decisions, are not for her parents to decide.
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India, it is resorted to widely, despite sporadic attempts to make it illegal. 150
In the West, amniocentesis followed by abortion of the "wrong" sex fetus
occurs, but without hard data. 15 1 In a 1989 survey, thirty-four percent of
American geneticists said they would perform prenatal diagnosis for sex
selection, and twenty-eight percent would refer the couple to someone who
would. 152 The only other method presently available by which one may
reliably choose the sex of one's offspring involves IVF and PIGD. 153
Various methods of douching and the timing of intercourse have been put
forward from time to time, but never with proven success.154 The least
cumbersome method of sex selection, sperm sorting before insemination, is
now on the horizon but is still in the experimental stage. 155 In this article, I
will discuss only those means of sex selection that do not involve abortion.
The lengthy analysis of the law and ethics of abortion that would be required
to ground a discussion of abortion for sex selection is beyond the purview of
this paper and would detract from the focus on the child's right to an open
future. Thus, some of the familiar and weighty arguments against sex
selection, e.g., that it discriminates against females by aborting primarily
female fetuses, that it misuses costly medical resources, or that it is an
ethically unacceptable reason for abortion, will not be relevant to this
discussion. In that respect, I have made my task harder: what arguments
against sex selection remain when there are no issues of destroying
developing human life or risking the woman's health?
The interest in sex selection, especially if it were freed from its present
dependence upon abortion, is easy to document, even if we confine our
observations to the industrial West. The sheer amount of resources scientists
have invested in the search for sperm-sorting techniques 156 suggests that
150. Dorothy Wertz & John Fletcher, Fatal Knowledge? Prenatal Diagnosis and Sex
Selection, 19 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21, 25 (May-June 1989) [hereinafter Wertz & Fletcher,
Fatal Knowledge?].
151. Id. at 21.
152. Id. The figures for those who would perform the procedure or who would refer
were sixty percent in Hungary, forty-seven percent in Canada, thirty-eight percent in Sweden,
and thirty-three percent in Israel.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 22-28.
154. BAYLES, supra note 50, at 34; COREA, supra note 48, at 199-201.
155. See Sex Selection for Non-medical Reasons, supra note 22, at 8.
156. COREA, supra note 48, at 199-201.
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there is a market. 157 In this country, the most common reason given is to
"balance" a family by having at least one child of each sex.
158
B. Arguments for and against sex selection
159
One cluster of arguments against sex selection is rooted in the
assumption that, if parents were able to choose their children's sex, the
population of the world would become skewed. Myriad studies support the
long-held assumption that there is a strong preference for boys. 160 If true,
this would lead to fewer women in the population. 16 1 Some commentators
157. Amitai Etzioni, Sex Control, Science, and Society, 161 SCIENCE 1107 (1968). "If
a simple and safe method of sex control were available, there would probably be no difficulty
in finding the investors to promote it because there is a mass-market potential." Id.
158. Helen Bequaert Holmes, Choosing Children's Sex: Challenges to Feminist
Ethics, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW 150, 150-51 (Joan Callahan ed., 1995).
159. I ignore the special situation of a family at risk for a sex-linked genetic disease,
e.g., hemophilia, where the goal is not to avoid a boy per se, but to avoid the birth of a baby
at high risk for hemophilia.
160. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 133; COREA, supra note 48, at 190-92.
161. Other studies show that, at least in the U.S., the most common preference is for a
"balanced" family of two children, with a boy first. NANCY E. WILLIAMSON, SONS OR
DAUGHTERS: A CROSS-CULTURAL SURVEY OF PARENTAL PREFERENCES 47 (1976). This strong
preference for first boys, coupled with studies that purport to show that the oldest child in the
family is more likely to be ambitious and assertive, and that girls are more likely to have
high-esteem if they have older sisters than older brothers, see COREA, supra note 48, at 206-
07, has caused some writers great concern. Tabitha Powledge, for example, writes that:
If [sex selection] is widely used to achieve the storybook two-child family (a boy
first, a girl second) then a pernicious pattern already present in these (industrialized)
countries-anxious, overachieving men and passive, accommodating women-might
be substantially reinforced, because those personality patterns also tend to be
characteristics of, respectively, first- and secondborns.
Tabitha Powledge, Toward a Moral Policy for Sex Choice, in SEX SELECTION OF CHILDREN
(Neil G. Bennett ed., 1983) (quoted in ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 137). Willard Gaylin, a
psychoanalyst who has studied Vietnam-era war resisters, noted that at the time of his
research, of the twenty-six resisters (not including Jehovah's Witnesses) imprisoned in the
two institutions he studied, twenty-one were eldest sons. WILLARD GAYLIN, IN THE SERVICE OF
THEIR COUNTRY: WAR RESISTERS IN PRISON 284-85 (1970). If one looked only at the white
resisters, twenty out of twenty-two were eldest sons. Id. At the same point in our history, it
was also true that every single astronaut was an eldest son. Id. Thus, whatever path being an
eldest son takes one, it appears to suggest an unusual degree of independence and
assertiveness. Id.
Mary Anne Warren, however, after an exhaustive review of the literature, asserts that
any conclusions about the psychological effects of birth order are due to errors in study
design. MARY ANNE WARREN, GENDERCIDE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF SEX SELECTION 141 (1985).
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think that this might improve the status of women by making them more
desirable. 162 However, most think that women would come to be valued
primarily for their reproductive potential and would be forced into ever
more narrow roles, kept in purdah, and so on. 163 Other writers argue that in
time the pendulum would come to rest in the middle, reverting back to the
virtually equal number of girls and boys we start off with today. 164 One
writer suggests that, if we started off with more males, the elderly
population would be less disproportionately female, giving rise to better
social opportunities. 165 On the other hand, fewer men would have the
opportunity to marry, which would have a negative impact on their health
and longevity. 166 A different version of the skewed population argument
focuses not on the status of women, but on the effect on society. Because
women commit fewer violent crimes, are more likely to attend church, and
are more active supporters of cultural events than men, a world with fewer
women would likely be more violent and less cultural, a sort of "wild West"
society 167
Another societal argument claims that if everyone were able to choose
their children's sex, we would lose the lessons that come from having to
"make the best of' the "wrong" gender; lessons that often lead to increased
openness and decreased sexism. Barbara Rothman speaks of how her father,
not having had a son, was forced to make the best of it and take his daughter
on fishing trips, and how those turned into her fondest memories of her
father. 168 Philosopher Michael Bayles uses the same argument to critique
the desire for a "balanced" family:
One might reply that someone ... need not be sexist or irrational to want a
boy. He has two daughters, and he would simply like to have a boy as well.
Had he had two boys, he might have wanted a girl. But why would two
daughters and one son be preferable to three daughters? Someone... might
respond that he would like a son so that he could have certain pleasures in
child rearing-such as fishing and playing ball with him. But that too is
probably a sexist assumption. As the father of two daughters, I have fished
and played ball with them, watched my daughter play on a ball team, and
162. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 136.
163. Holmes, supra note 158, at 149.
164. Charles F. Westoff and Ronald R. Rindfuss, Sex Preselection in the United
States: Some Implications, 184 SCIENCE 133, 136 ( May 1974).
165. BAYLES, supra note 50, at 36.
166. Holmes, supra note 158, at 153.
167. Etzioni,supra note 157, at 1109.
168. RoTIMAN, supra note 20, at 138.
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gone camping and hiking with them, as well as cooked, cleaned house, done
laundry, and engaged in various other so-called women's activities with
them. 1
69
Bayles concludes that, "[wiere children allowed to develop freely their own
interests and talents, children of the same sex would probably exhibit as
much diversity as children of opposite sexes."
170
An argument that has particular potency when applied to
underdeveloped countries involves the efficacy of sex selection for
population control. One version of this argument proposes that if there were
fewer females in the next generation there would obviously be fewer
"breeders," and therefore fewer children born, a boon in overpopulated
countries which have had only qualified success with more conventional
avenues of family planning. 171 A different version of this argument takes
the tack that people often have larger families than they really want in an
effort to have children of the desired sex. Thus, in India, for example, where
male children are all-important and a woman's status, health, and even life
may depend on producing sons, 172 giving people the opportunity to
preselect their offsprings' sex would result in smaller families. Since
societies which highly value boys and devalue girls tend to be the same
societies struggling with high population rates, 173 sex selection could have a
powerful impact. Against these arguments, critics assert that eliminating
females to control population is inherently sexist, racist, and misogynist, and
will not necessarily work. 174 If it is true that a society with fewer women
will tend to restrict their societal roles, we may discover that-with only
childbearing to define them-women in these societies will have larger
families.
169. BAYLES, supra note 50, at 35.
170. Id.
171. COREA, supra note 48, at 210. This argument is made by, among others, John
Postgate.
172. Holmes, supra note 158, at 152.
173. This is not a coincidence. Studies in India and elsewhere show that the most
effective strategy for lowering the birthrate is to educate and empower women. GERALD
MEIER, LEADING IssuEs N ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 577-78 (1984) Another effective strategy
is to improve the infant and child mortality rate, thus reassuring parents that the children they
have will live to maturity. Id. at 576-77. It is no surprise that, to improve the infant and child
mortality rate, it is important to educate and empower women. In fact, one argument against
sex preselection might be that it provides a "quick and dirty" solution to a problem,
overpopulation, which is better solved by improving the lot of women.
174. Holmes, supra note 158, at 153. See also WARREN, supra note 161, at 163ff.
1997]
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A different type of argument is agnostic about the causes and
consequences of sex selection, but asserts that as the technology becomes
available, choosing the sex of one's baby is part of a couple's basic right to
reproductive choice. In a 1985 study, Wertz and Fletcher presented 295
American geneticists with the case of a couple who have four daughters and
requested prenatal diagnosis so they can abort a fifth pregnancy if the fetus
is a girl.175 Sixty-two percent of the geneticists surveyed responded that
they would accede to the couple's request. 176 When asked why, the
geneticists stated that they perceived sex choice as "a logical extension of
parents' rights to control the number, timing, spacing, and quality of their
offspring." 177 This is in line with the focus on client autonomy that is
pervasive in genetic counseling.
In the case of arguments which rest on parental choice, we see that
opposition focuses on the dangers of turning children into "commodities."
Parents become consumers whose goal is the "perfect" child, with the
assumed corollary that less than "perfect" children will be devalued. Thus,
just as "yuppie" consumers purchase the perfect house, the perfect car and
the perfect wine, they may also purchase the perfect baby. Wertz and
Fletcher fear that if sex selection is permitted, it will be a precedent for other
requests to avoid short children, nearsighted children, or children whose IQs
are merely average. 178 The result could be a return to the excesses of the
eugenics movement. 179 Maura Ryan, in a feminist critique of unlimited
parental choice, points out that assisted reproduction is expensive and
burdensome and wonders "how parents might look upon offspring when
175. Wertz and Fletcher, Fatal Knowledge?, supra note 150, at 21.
176. Id. Thirty-four percent of the geneticists said they would perform the prenatal
diagnosis themselves, and 28% answered that they would refer the couple to someone who
would perform the diagnosis. Id.
177. Id. at 21.
178. Wertz and Fletcher, Fatal Knowledge?, supra note 150, at 24. As in Lake
Wobegon, in the world of genetic selection all the children are above average.
179. "The term eugenics refers to efforts to improve the inborn characteristics of the
human species by applying rules of heredity to human propogation. In the first part of this
century many eugenicists called for regulated marriages, sterilization, immigration
restrictions, and permanent confinement of individuals considered 'misfits."' PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS: A REPORT
ON THE ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC SCREENING, COUNSELING,
AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS 10 (1983).
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they enter the process with the belief that a certain kind of child is owed to
them, and after they have paid a high price for that child.
180
C. Sex Selection and the Child's Right to an Open FutUre
In many Western nations, where genetic counseling embodies a culture
of respect for autonomy and where population control is not a pressing issue,
a subtle but powerful argument can be made that sex selection is wrong
because it abrogates the child's right to an open future. Why, after all, do
parents have strong preferences for girls or boys, even if that preference is
merely in the context of family "balance," the one rationale that some
ethicists are prepared to find blameless, if not compelling? 18 1 Parents whose
preferences for one sex or the other are compelling enough for them to take
active steps to control the outcome must, logically, be committed to certain
strong gender-role expectations of the children they will raise. If they want a
girl that badly, whether they are hoping for a Miss America or the next
Catherine MacKinnon, they are likely to make it difficult for the actual child
to resist their expectations and follow her own bent. Sociologist Barbara
Rothman states:
[W]hen you start from the premise that one can "determine" fetal sex in the
sense that it can be chosen, then the stereotypes predict the choice: people
who want an active, vigorous, achieving child will have boys. And when
they want a sweeter, quieter, more loving child, they will have girls. 182
Rothman's point holds even for those who would argue that gender
stereotypes have been breaking down dramatically in the ten years since her
book was published. For example, the 1996 Olympics exhibited exhilarating
performances by women athletes, and the United States Supreme Court has
just decided that Virginia Military Institute and The Citadel will no longer
be able to exclude women. 183 But such optimism does not invalidate
180. Maura Ryan, The Argument for Unlimited Procreative Liberty: A Feminist
Critique, in WHAT PRICE PARENTHOOD? ETHics AND AsSISTED REPRODUCTION 86 (Courtney
Campbell ed., 1992)
181. Wertz and Fletcher, Fatal Knowledge?, supra note 150, at 23. "We find no moral
reasons to condemn the desire to balance gender in families, especially if used by parents who
want their children to respect sex-based differences and to learn fairness to the opposite sex
by practicing it at home." Id.
182. ROTHmAN, supra note 20, at 138.
183. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
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Rothman's point. If stereotypes are breaking down, why is it so important to
have a child of the "desired" sex? If someone wants a daughter so that she
can be groomed to be the first female navy admiral, that is still perceiving
her primarily in terms of gender. As Rothman says, "[i]f our sons are chosen
as sons and our daughters as daughters, we will see them entirely through
their gender."1
84
Because gender is only one among many characteristics, but one that
carries very heavy baggage in our society, to view a child primarily through
its gender narrows the child's ability to choose his or her own path in life.
The same would be true if we could choose children's height, musical
ability, or intelligence. At present, however, the one trait we can pinpoint
and control is gender. Maura Ryan, arguing more generally against
unfettered procreative liberty, challenges a framework where a desire
for a particular type of child ... is seldom weighed appropriately against the
reality of the child-to-be as a potential autonomous human being. At what
point does a being, who has been conceived, gestated, and born according to
someone's specifications, become herself or himself? And if a child comes
into the world primarily to fulfill parental need, are there limits to what a
parent may do to ensure that the child will continue to meet the specific
expectations? 18
5
D. Knowledge of Fetal Sex and the Child's Right to an Open Future
In the process of doing a chromosomal analysis to rule out Down's
Syndrome and other problems, it is impossible for a lab technician not to
determine the fetus's sex. The custom in our country at this time is for this
piece of information to be transmitted from the lab to the physician, who
typically asks the couple if they wish to know the sex of their baby-to-be.
Although women have reported mixed feelings on this subject, 186 the vast
majority of women who have had amniocentesis do end up learning the sex
of their fetus. 187 Because all women over thirty-five are counseled to
consider amniocentesis, as well as younger women with medical indications
or family histories of genetic disease, this means that a great many women
in America today know their baby's sex well before it is born. In fact, it is
quite common for people to ask a pregnant woman if she is carrying a boy or
184. RoTHMAN, supra note 20, at 139.
185. Ryan, supra note 180, at 86.
186. RoTHMAN, supra note 20, at 121-123.
187. Id. at 121.
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a girl, or for parents to announce their baby's name when he or she is still
months away from being born.
188
Few commentators see this practice as an ethical issue (or at least when
parents have no plans to act upon their knowledge to abort a fetus of the
undesired sex). It is certainly a strange development, in that it calls into
question many common customs. Of course, friends and relatives will still
be delighted to get that dramatic phone call from the happy parents, telling
them that mother and baby are healthy, but without the news that it's a girl
or a boy, the announcement lacks a certain something. And the obstetrician
does not say, as he holds the baby up for the mother to see, "It's a baby!"
However strange these issues seem, we will leave them for the
anthropologists (and marketers of infant goods) to worry about.
However, there is an ethical issue here, even though it is subtle. There is
some evidence to show that, for parents who know the sex of their fetus,
sexual stereotyping begins even before birth. Joan Callahan describes a
conversation with a woman whose daughter had recently learned that the
baby she was carrying was a boy:
The woman had no discernible preference for a boy grandchild over a girl
grandchild, but she was delighted to know that her grandchild would be a
boy because, she said, she could now "begin getting ready for him." When
asked what that meant, she saw immediately that it meant certain colors for
blankets and sweaters, certain sorts of toys and room decorations. Long
before he was even born, this child would be started on a "boy track,"
surrounded by blues and trains, never pinks and dolls. 189
Pregnancy, perhaps especially when amniocentesis has freed one from at
least some of the attendant anxieties, is a time rich with dreaming. If the
fetus is quiet while one is listening to Bach, that shows great musical talent,
while every fetal kick means that an Olympic soccer player is in the making.
Just as the very early developing embryo is "totipotent," 190 the very early
developing parent entertains a vast range of possibilities. In our heavily
gendered culture, many of those dreams are lost, and others become locked
in, the minute the baby is born and the sex is known.
188. Id. at 124-127.
189. Holmes, supra note 158, at 136.
190. Human Embryo Research Report, supra note 23, at 107. Totipotent means that
each of the embryo's cells has an unlimited capability of differentiating into different tissues
and organs. Id.
1997]
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Most social scientists agree that gender socialization begins at birth and
studies show that adults treat babies they think are male or female quite
differently from the first days of life. 19 1 However, with amniocentesis it is
possible for gender socialization to begin before birth. Barbara Rothman, in
an ingenious study, asked women to describe the movements of their fetus
during the final trimester. 192 Women who did not know their baby's sex
before birth used a variety of adjectives, without any pattern connected to
the sex of their baby. 193 However, when women knew their fetus's sex, a
distinct pattern emerged. 194 The movements of female fetuses were much
less likely to be described as "strong" and "vigorous." 195 The word "lively"
was used often to describe females, but never males.
[W]hile some more masculine-sounding descriptions were given for female
fetuses' movements, there were never feminine-sounding descriptions for
male fetuses' movements. This is a common enough observation regarding
gender-it is more acceptable for women and girls to be in some ways
masculine than it ever is for men and boys to be 'effeminate.' 196
Thus, one may make the argument that knowing the baby's sex before it
is born encourages the kind of gender stereotyping that threatens to limit the
child's right to an open future. This is such a subtle argument that it hardly
justifies frustrating a parent's right to know if they demand access to the
information. However, Rothman points out that the urge to know the fetus's
sex often arises from the parents' knowledge that the doctor or the lab
technician already knows:
It is not simply that the information is now knowable. It is also that it is
known. It is known to the medical personnel, and once the sex of the fetus
becomes part of the medical record, it makes sense to treat it just as one
would other information on that record. Nancy said she asked the sex
because: "I want all the information available to the physician to be available
to me."
191. Jeffrey Z. Rubin et al., The Eye of the Beholder: Parents' Views on Sex of
Newborns, 44 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIAT. 512 (July 1974).
192. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 130.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. Parents who did not know the sex of their fetuses were equally likely to
describe male or female fetuses as strong or lively. Id.
196. Id.
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From knowable information, to part of the medical record, the sex of the
fetus finally becomes part of the "patient's condition." Spelling it out most
clearly, Martha says she asked to know the sex of her fetus because "I
believe a patient has the right and moral responsibility to know as much as
possible about his or her condition." In this way sex itself is medicalized.
The pregnant woman by virtue of her pregnancy is a patient, and the sex of
her fetus, by virtue of its place on the medical record, is part of her
condition. Sex is a diagnosable chromosomal condition.
197
One way to discourage the practice of reporting fetal sex, while still
respecting the rights of parents who insist on knowing, is to adopt a policy
suggested by Wertz and Fletcher in the context of discouraging actual sex
selection. They propose that information about fetal sex remain in the lab
and not be routinely reported to the doctor. 198 Therefore, the doctor also
would not know, and fewer patients would be prompted to ask for the
information. The information would be available for parents who ask, but
reporting would no longer be considered routine. 199 This would also avoid
the now rather common occurrence of parents who asked not to know being
told by overenthusiastic nurses and physicians.
200
E. Conclusion
Sex selection, even in the absence of abortion, limits the child's right to
an open future because it promotes gender role stereotyping and encourages
parents to invest heavily in having certain types of children. This
combination of investment and stereotyping makes it more difficult for the
child to grow and develop in ways that are different than, perhaps even in
conflict with, parental expectations. Just knowing the fetus's sex, even
outside of any attempt to predetermine it, may exacerbate gender
stereotyping by allowing parents to begin the "tracking" process before the
baby is born. Thus, policies which encourage sex selection or
predetermination should be discouraged.
197. Id. at 122-23.
198. Wertz and Fletcher, Fatal Knowledge?, supra note 150, at 27.
199. Id. at 26-27.
200. ROTHMAN, supra note 20, at 122.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
As the Human Genome Project continues its string of successes, and as
assisted reproduction becomes ever more innovative, new challenges arise
for social policy and for the medical and allied professions. The law is too
blunt an instrument to be an appropriate vehicle of social policy in this area.
As experience with sex selection through amniocentesis and abortion has
shown, couples can always get around the law. Further, genetic counseling is
such a subtle and sensitive art, and the counselees are in such a state of
anxiety and often grief, that to burden counselors with being legal
watchdogs would cause substantial harm for very little gain. Thus, the
appropriate engine for expressing social policy in this area is in the codes
and policy statements of the professionals themselves.
In this article, I have argued that healthcare providers should refuse to
participate in endeavors to assist parents in deliberating creating disabled
children, and should also refuse to participate in sex selection (unless it is
for the purpose of avoiding a sex-related disease). I have also argued that
providers should be extremely wary of parental requests to test children for
adult-onset genetic disease. Finally, I suggest that the practice of informing
parents of the sex of the fetus should be gently discouraged. All of these
proposals can be implemented through policy statements by professional
organizations.
In order for genetic counselors, medical geneticists and others to adopt
these policies, they must be convinced that they are not in conflict with the
powerful norm of respect for autonomy that virtually defines these
professions. Thus, arguing that parental wishes should be overruled-due to
considerations of beneficence (the well-being of the child) or justice (the
well-being of society) is likely to be unpersuasive. The concept of the
child's right to an open future offers a new way to resolve these issues by
focusing on the autonomy of the child (present or future) as a limit on the
autonomy of the parents. Thus, counselors and others are challenged, not to
compromise or soften their commitment to autonomy, but to deepen and
broaden it by taking the autonomy of the child into their range of moral
vision as well.
[Vol. 28:549
HeinOnline  -- 28 Rutgers L.J. 592 1996-1997
